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Zoltan BalazsAbstract
The paper argues that values are universals, either properties or relations. For the latter, instantiation is a matter of
the content of the relation, the relata, and the context (the instantiation of further relations). This moderate realist
conception helps us solve some notorious problems in axiology, i.e. malicious pleasure, compassion, envy, and
perverted love. Another other important implication of this conception is that there is a further property, the one of
being a value. It is a higher-order property which can be instantiated by relation (and property) values to various
degrees. Finally, the questions of whether particularity is a value and how rarity can be a value are also addressed.
The underlying ontological conception provides a sound way of finding a answer to these questions as well.
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For axiology, problems such as wicked or perverse love,
malicious pleasure, suffering because of another person’s
pleasure, or compassion have divided theorists. What
seem to be unconditional values (love, pleasure) may be-
come part of something bad; what seems to be an uncon-
ditional disvalue (suffering) may become part something
good (suffering because of the other’s suffering). Values
and disvalues appear to form complexes or wholes whose
axiological index may be different from that of its compo-
nents. But how is this possible? Simply declaring that
there can be such a difference is not an explanation. A
more convincing answer is needed. The present attempt
relies on a realist account of values and directs the focus
on instantiation which is considered responsible for these
differences.
In a realist account of values, values are universals.
Beauty is a value that can be predicated of various particu-
lars. Politeness is another value, predicable of various par-
ticulars. Love is also a value, but it presupposes at least
two particulars. Similarly for trust or forgiveness. We can
thus distinguish between property values and relation
values. Some values are less unequivocally categorizable:
pleasure might be an example. It is possible that we simply
‘feel’ pleasure without there being an object to which our
pleasure is related, but in most, perhaps virtually in all,
cases we are ‘pleased at’ something, hence probably theCorrespondence: balazszoltan1@t-online.hu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pontologically proper rendering of pleasure is always ‘being
pleased at,’ which is a relation. Similarly,’ love’ is more
properly rendered as ‘being in love of ’ or ‘loves’ or ‘being
loved by.’
It seems that there are disvalues, too, though axiological
literature seldom mentions the concept of disvalue1, not
to speak of intrinsic disvalue. Our axiological vocabulary
is, however, full of concepts denoting properties and rela-
tions with a negative axiological index. Disvalues are not
simply missing values, not even in the case when a value’s
presence is or was expected (the dinner party was not en-
joyable, but it was not boring, either), though, of course,
disappointment in this case is a disvalue. Nor are disvalues
simply ‘deformed’ or ‘misplaced’ values, like the heroism
of Don Quijote, since ‘deformation’ or ‘misplacement’ and
similar notions refer to (higher-order) relations between
values, not to values themselves. The source of such con-
fusions is partly language itself. Some disvalues have their
proper names (ugliness, hatred, pain) some are denials or
opposites of values (impoliteness). Notwithstanding the
pluralism of expressions, the basic idea is alway the same.
There are properties and relations we consider, ceteris
paribus, not only unworthy of protection and preserva-
tion, but often worthy of destruction.
If values are universals, then a number of ontological
presuppositions are virtually accepted and the related
problems necessarily appear. First of all, the idea that
there are universals entails that there are particulars, and
the problem of how the two entities are related ensues.
The instantiation of universals is one of the greatestn Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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accept the distinction between particulars and univer-
sals, need to explain how the latter get instantiated by
the former entities. Most realists today reject the Pla-
tonic view that ideas (universals) may exist separately
from particulars. Their typical view is that only instanti-
ated universals exist. All we can know about particulars
are expressed by universals, particulars themselves (in a
‘bare’ state) are inaccessible. Still, they must be pre-
supposed, otherwise the plurality of things would col-
lapse into a single entity. But then it is a problem of
how universals get instantiated by particulars.
By going further along this reasoning one may conclude
that only particulars exist. This would be the nominalist pos-
ition. But then it will be necessary to explain why certain
particulars are similar in certain respects. Even if complete
identity between such ‘respects’ is excluded, that is, the de-
nial of universals is maintained, and only ‘resemblance’ is
allowed for, the relation of ‘resemblance’ will be a new ontic
entity, obviously not a particular. The problem of how ‘re-
semblance’ obtains or gets instantiated, reemerges.
Remaining within the realist framework, the problem
of instantiation, i.e. how to explain the connection be-
tween, or connectedness of, particulars and universals,
has been approached in various ways. The focus of these
proposals has been largely the ‘tie’ or ‘nexus’ which does
the job of connecting the two types of entities. Such pro-
posals usually provoke the objection that, nilly-willy, an-
other type of entity is presupposed which is neither a
universal, nor a particular. Defenders of such proposals
try to fend off this objection by diverting the ontological
image of a ‘thing’ that exists out there in reality to a dif-
ferent kind of image, something that is real yet formal.
Terms such as ‘non-relational tie’ or ‘aspect’ or ‘sense’
may be used2. These attempts will not be discussed here
in detail, for such a discussion belongs in an ontological
paper. The basic idea all these theorists share and defend
might be captured by a very pedestrian example. If I am
stopped on the threshold to the house, with one leg in,
the other out, I may be said to be both in the house and
out of it, though the two spaces are different, and I am
the same person. It is both true that I cannot be at two
different places at the same time, and that I am both in
and out. What is needed to make sense of this state of
affairs is not to abandon the idea of ‘space’ or ‘place’ and
the unity of the person, but to introduce a further con-
cept, such as that of the ‘sense’ or ‘respect’. Hence, in-
stantiation is a concept that works with and in its own
terms, affecting the reality neither of particulars nor of
universals, yet it is just meant to answer the question of
how they are connected to each other. In this context,
the instantiation of values as universals is merely an ap-
plied case of the instantiation of universals and there is
no need to discuss it separately.The problem of how some universals instantiate the
supposedly higher-order universal of being a value, is in-
sertable to such a conception, too. For instance, univer-
sals such as beauty or politeness are usually considered
values, whereas redness or being a cube are not. But
there also are many universals that look ambiguous.
Think of originality, novelty, awesomeness, prestige, pro-
vocativeness, or curiosity. They are surely values to some
extent, or in some sense, but not as unambiguously or
thoroughly as beauty or love. If such graduality is possible
among value universals, then the implication is that being
a value is a higher-order property of various universals
that is instantiated to various degrees by various univer-
sals. Beauty is a value-property all the way through, it may
called a pure value universal. Novelty is a value property,
or probably a value relation, which is not a pure value uni-
versal, since only in virtue of the novelty of something we
do not usually attach great value to it, but it does confer
some value to most things. Such universals seem to in-
stantiate the universal of being a value to a lesser extent.
They are not only values, so it appears. Nevertheless, the
instantiation of being a value by another universal is to be
explained in terms of instantiation3.
How do universals obtain?
Instantiation is, therefore, an ontological operation or
event. But in order to be able to answer the original
question, that is, how to account for axiological differ-
ences in various value complexes, the notion of instanti-
ation must be extended. The next question is ‘what
makes property A obtain?’ Alternatively, ‘in virtue of
what is property A instantiated?’ A particular face may
be beautiful or ugly, a gesture polite or impolite, a rela-
tionship that of love or hatred, and a person may be
filled with pleasure or suffering. What we want to know
is not merely in how the connection between a face and
beauty is established. We want to know in virtue of what
the face is beautiful. Of course, there are natural causes
of a state of affair ‘that a face is beautiful, ‘or’ that Romeo
loves Juliet.’ Sciences and arts are there just to discover
and explain these causes. Our interest is ontological:
given the world of universals and particulars, and on the
presumption that their connectedness is explained in
terms of instantiation, we still want to know how a par-
ticular connection comes about. The problem of instan-
tiation is not solved by examining the tie between
universals and particulars, it can be extended to looking
for an explanation of how, in virtue of what, such ties or
connections there can be.
This question and problem is, again, not restricted to
values but here only the instantiation, the coming about
of values, will be discussed. If the results are sound, then
they may be generalized to non-value universals, too.
But before the discussion of concrete examples begins,
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of value-bearing. The usual question asked is ‘what
things/entities bear value?’ On the conception of instan-
tiation outlined so far, another question to be asked is
‘how do things/entities bear value?’ Thereby the relation
of ‘bearing’ or ‘bears’ is replaced by the relation of in-
stantiation. This is a simple terminological operation.
Given the prevalence of the first question, however, it is
necessary to reflect on it briefly4.
Let us say a face is beautiful. Then it is a particular
that bears the value of beauty. Alternatively, we may say
that the face is beautiful yet it is the one millionth
reproduction of a Raffaello Madonna, and conclude that
‘it’ is not (really) valuable. ‘It’ refers here to the copy, of
whatever form, and entails that beauty is just one aspect
of it that needs to be taken into account, yet ‘its’ value is
not ‘born’ by beauty only. Other instances of value bear-
ing may be even more complicated. Particulars are
usually interpreted as persons or objects, but value
judgements are often made of experiences and events. If
I recall a pleasant experience, I may feel actual pleasure,
and conclude that certain memories are pleasurable or
pleasing (and others painful). An inauguration ceremony
may be dignified and hence valuable. Those whose
ontology is based on tropes and does not allow for par-
ticulars and universals as separate entities will assert that
it is tropes that bear values. Wittgensteinians say that
the world contains only facts or states of affairs, where-
fore values are ‘born’ by facts or states of affairs. It is a
value that the car is beautiful or that I love my child.
On such an account, beauty and love are not themselves
values but value-making qualities or features, like in the
first example of the copy of the Raffaello painting.
It appears thus that the answer to the question of
‘what bears value’ depends on one’s ontological precon-
ception. In a sense this is indeed the case. If there are no
particulars/universals, they cannot bear values. If the
world is made of states of affairs, only states of affairs can
bear value. But the issue is not so simple. The notion of
‘value bearing’ itself presupposes a distinction between
two kinds of entities: those that have a special relation
(that of bearing) to another type of entity, value(s). Thus,
it appears that those who find the question ‘what bears
value?’ meaningful already make an implicit distinction
between ‘value-bearers’ and ‘value(s)’. The brackets are im-
portant. For the next question is whether that which is
born by ‘value-bearers’ is simply ‘value’ or it can be several
‘values.’ The literature on intrinsic value, ever since Moore
introduced this term in his Principia Ethica5, has been in-
clined towards the interpretation of the problem of value
bearing in terms of ‘intrinsic value being born by’ this or
that. However, nothing compels us to follow Moore here.
Not only intrinsic value, but any kind of value may belong
to the set of entities that are related to another set ofentities by the relation of ‘bearing.’ What remains inevit-
able is the precommitment to the view that values or (in-
trinsic) value are entities different from those that bear
them. But this is, of course, the realist view.
But if ontological realism is accepted, then the ques-
tion of where value is to be found will be answered by
saying: among universals. It is possible that we shall have
to make a further distinction between values and intrin-
sic value, but the relation of ‘value bearing’ will first ap-
pear between particulars (whether they are persons,
objects, or events) and universals, that is, concrete
values. Even if the one millionth copy of the Raffaello
Madonna is much less valuable than the original paint-
ing, beauty is still born by each copy and the original. It
is just that further values are born by the original which
make it more valuable. It is also possible that some spe-
cial value arises out of the complex whole, or bundle of
value properties, which the original possesses, but not
the copies (more on this example later). On this Moore’s
intuition was probably right. But this is just when the
other question, namely, ‘how are values born?’ or ‘how
do things bear value(s)?’ becomes urgent and interesting.
In what follows I shall consider particular cases and
make suggestions of how to any value bearer might be
analysed and the instantiation of values be explained.
There won’t emerge a single winning way of explaining
the instantiation of values, from which it follows that in-
stantiation is an ontological phenomenon that may have
various causes, some being active and others passive
here but not there and vice versa.
Perverted love
Compare Hitler’s love of Germany and Churchill’s love
of England. We surely want to make a sharp distinction
between the two cases in terms of value. How can we
make it?
One possibility is to take the two cases ‘organic
wholes’ in the Moorean sense and simply assert that the
first case does not represent ‘intrinsic’ value (or much
less), whereas the second case does (or much more). But
this is insufficient. An explanation is required, since the
structure of both ‘wholes’ is identical ([hLg] and [cLe])
and the universal of Love which is a relation value,
henceforth rendered as ‘Loves,’ occurs in both wholes.
There are three logical possibilities. First, that ‘Loves’ is
not instantiated, after all. It is a mistake to think it is.
Second, that the particulars involved instantiate further
values and disvalues which account for the difference of
the two cases. And third, that despite the apparent simi-
larity, the ‘structures’ of the two cases are different. Let
us examine each possibility.
First, suppose that the content of the relation ‘Loves’ is
indeed the same in both cases. Both Hitler’s love of
Germany and Churchill’s love of England involve the
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pects of the relation ‘Loves’6 and both persons and col-
lectives involved are adequate subjects of love7. Thus,
there is no ontological difference between them. Given
the identity of the content of ‘Loves’ in both cases, it is
possible that both Hitler’s love for Germany and
Churchill’s love for England are true instances of ‘Loves.’
But we may speculate further and, especially given the
complexity of ‘Loves’ as a relation value, find differences.
For instance, since Hitler’s love of Germany turned out
to be compatible with his willingness to destroy it, we
may conclude that he hated Germany at least as much
as he loved it, and such an ambivalence is simply incom-
patible with love. This is another relation, which may lack
a linguistic term, yet ontologically different from both love
and hatred. Alternatively, we can imagine some second-
order relations intervening, such as corruption or deform-
ation, as in the case of Don Quijote’s misguided heroism.
Of course, the instantiation of second-order relations
raises further questions, but it is sufficient here to allow
for the possibility that, for instance, the proposition ‘Hat-
red Corrupts Love’ is ontically grounded. The result is the
same: ‘Loves’ is different in the two cases. It holds for
[cLe] but it does not hold for [hLg]. Rather, the latter rela-
tion is [hCLg], that is, Hitler ‘pervertedly loves’ Germany,
or [hHLg], that is, Hitler ‘hates/loves’ Germany.
Secondly, consider the what seems to be the most
plausible option, namely, that it is the two persons who
account for the difference between the two cases in
terms of value. Unusual as it may sound, we must as-
sume (1) that further values and disvalues being instanti-
ated by Hitler and Churchill contribute to the value of
the two wholes, in this example, crucially; and (2) that
these values and disvalues are in some sense aggregable,
yielding a judgement about the valuableness or worth of
each person, by which we are able to account for the ax-
iological difference between the two cases. Thus, even
though both persons ‘Love’ their respective countries
equally (it is also presupposed that there is not any dif-
ference in terms of the intensity or strength of the rela-
tion ‘Loves’ in either case, where ‘intensity’ might be
another second-order relation), the value of ‘Loves’ con-
tributes to the two persons’ worth or valuableness only
marginally. There are other values and disvalues which
they instantiate and which may be greater and more sig-
nificant than these. From this argument it follows that the
axiological difference between ‘Hitler loves Germany’ and
‘Churchill loves England’ supervenes on values and dis-
values only virtually present in the two propositions8.
Thus, in the strict sense, we are not explaining the axio-
logical difference in terms of ‘Loves’ but of other value
universals, and of the valuableness or worth of the relata.
But it also seems possible to insist on the initial sug-
gestion, namely, that the two cases can be explained interms of the relation value ‘Loves,’ but with the help of
the concept of valuableness or worth. Suppose that the
total sum of values and disvalues Hitler instantiates re-
sults in a negative worth of him. Notice that it does not
follow that he hasn’t got any value whatsoever, and a
single value may be thought to be sufficient to justify
some ethical protection (for instance, against torture as
punishment). Still, it is theoretically and axiologically
possible to conclude that he possesses negative worth. It
may then be suggested that for ‘Loves’ to get instantiated
a positive worth is a necessary precondition. It is impos-
sible for certain persons to ‘Love’ anything, despite the
emotional, intellectual, even moral, similarities of their af-
fection toward, for instance, their children and the affec-
tion other, ‘normal’ people have to theirs. If this sounds
absurd, think of the horrible case of the Goebbels who
killed their children prior to their own suicide. It makes
sense to ask the question: did they ever ‘Love’ their chil-
dren? (Contrast this case with Salomon’s test of the two
women claiming a baby to be its mothers!) Thus, we may
say that even though ‘Loves’ is a value, its being instanti-
ated presupposes the instantiation of the second-order
property of having positive worth of the relata.
To this suggestion it might be objected that it makes
relation values partly supervene on other values, and
thus partly second-order relations, which is inconsistent
with the general conception of values as first-order uni-
versals. However, even if values are first-order universals,
their instantiation may sometimes depend on other
values’ being instantiated. Think of the Platonic concept
of justice (or morality, a kind of social and moral har-
mony) which presupposes the right ordering of other
virtues, namely, modesty, courage, and wisdom. Thus, it
is possible that the relation value of ‘Loves’ also presup-
poses other values being instantiated, in this case, posi-
tive worth. The result is, again, that Hitler’s love of
Germany turns out to be something else than love, since
his axiological worth is negative. In general, the instanti-
ation of relation values might be blocked if the relata, or
at least one of them, have negative (or very low?) worth.
For it is also possible that it is the other relatum that
blocks the instantiation of the relation value: in E. T. A.
Hoffman’s tale, Der Sandmann, Nathanael falls in love
with Olympia, who/which is a doll; is it a ‘Love’ affair?
The puzzling case of Don Quijote is similar, his heroism
is, on this account, not heroism at all.
Another objection is that the worth of the particular
cannot influence the instantiation of a value (and pos-
sibly not only relation, but property values as well), since
worth and valuableness themselves supervene on the
values that are instantiated. Hitler’s love for Germany as
love cannot supervene on Hitler’s worth, since his worth
partly supervenes on his love for Germany. This is in-
deed a logical consequence of the reasoning but not
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structure of the problem is similar to the one of the rela-
tionship between our moral actions and moral charac-
ters. Character traits follow from our actions, and
actions flow out of our character traits. Moral worth is a
result of values we have, and whether or not specific
values obtain is partly a matter of our moral worth9.
There are cases where not only one, but both relata
have negative worth. Obviously, in such cases the instan-
tiation of the relation value in question is double-
blocked. Thus, trust between burglars is, axiologically
(and even perhaps psychologically), not trust – as a
value – at all; the devil’s being pleased at destruction is
not a value. Of course, it requires a very accurate moral
examination to conclude that a person has ‘negative
worth’ (things, objects, ideas having negative worth are
much easier to argue for), and one may doubt that such
a conclusion can ever be justified. This is, however, a
problem for ethical theory.
Thirdly, we may reinterpret the alternative suggestion
that was made in the first point about hate and love be-
ing mutually exclusive relations. According to it, if both
hate and love can be predicated of an empirical relation-
ship, we have to deal with a relation that is neither love,
nor hate, but something else. Our vocabulary (in fact,
the vocabulary of a particular language) may or may not
contain an independent word for this, and there is an
ample room for further psychological and moral analysis
of such phenomena10. Now the reinterpretation of this
possibility takes a different route. It refers to the context
of the relation.
Think, for instance, of the non-value relations of ‘be-
ing left to’ and ‘being right to’. These are essentially
context-dependent relations, that is, their instantiation is
ontologically not only a matter of the two things being
spatially related, but equally a matter of the point of
view the relation is predicated from. That point of view
implies another relation, and thus we have three rela-
tions, even though only one of them is (e.g. ‘a is left to
b’) actually predicated. Relation values may be similar.
They may supervene not only on the particulars they
connect and on the content of the relation, but also on
the presence or absence of other relation values which
constitute the contexts for them. It is not easy to tell
whether or not ‘Loves’ in our case is in fact instantiated,
because it is very much a matter of other value (and dis-
value) relations’ being also instantiated. Even if Hitler
‘Loves’ Germany, his hatred of, and despise for, other
peoples and nations provides a context for ‘Loves’ that
blocks its instantiation. The argument is not that ‘Loves’
and ‘Hates’ both contribute to the worth of the individ-
ual, which influences the instantiation of both, since that
would be falling back to the previous argument. Instead,
it is supposed that certain relation values and disvaluesare especially sensitive to some other values and dis-
values (mainly to their counterparts) that provide a spe-
cial context for them. If it is true that ‘a is left to b’
provided that I occupy a position c, it may not be true if
I occupied a position d (which might be on the other
side of the virtual line between a and b, or exactly on
the line, or simply my turning my back to them). Of
course, it is not as easy to determine whether ‘Loves’ or
‘Hates’ is in fact instantiated as to determine from a
fixed point whether a is left to or right to b. ‘Loves’ and
‘Hates’ are themselves complex value relations, inter-
twined with values and disvalues by higher-order rela-
tions. It is merely a possible and reasonable assumption
that ‘Loves’ and ‘Hates’ provide special contexts for one
another that mutually play a constitutive role in their
instantiation.
To sum up: Hitler’s love for Germany (1a) may be a
true instance of love, but of minor ethical importance;
(1b) may be something else than love, as a result of its
being combined with his hatred of Germany; (2) may
not be instantiated at all, because his axiological worth is
negative; (3) may not be instantiated at all, because his
hatred (of other particulars) provided a context for love
that blocks its instantiation. The general lesson is that
the instantiation of values supervenes on the relation (its
content), the relata, and the context.
Malicious pleasure
It will be instructive to see how these results can be ap-
plied to the case of malicious pleasure (‘Schadenfreude’)
which has been a notorious problem of axiologists ever
since Brentano. In a recent discussion of it which draws
on Brentano’s, Ross’s and Chisholm’s related views, Noah
Lemos concludes that “we may say that the property of
being pleased that someone is suffering is not an intrin-
sically good-making property (. . .) [but] it hardly follows
that the property of being pleased is not (. . .). These are,
after all, distinct properties, since one can have the latter
without having the former. (. . .) The fact that someone is
pleased is different from the fact that someone is pleased
that someone is suffering11.”
Now it is hard to understand how it can be the case
that being pleased is an intrinsically good-making prop-
erty whereas being pleased that someone is suffering is
not. That the two cases are different is clear, how their
difference is to be accounted for, is unclear. Lemos holds
the view that the bearers of intrinsic value are facts, not
properties. But his own conclusion makes it clear that
the difference between facts must rest on some differ-
ences between (good-making) properties, therefore we
must seek an answer within the facts themselves. His
mere asserting that the two properties are different,
however, is insufficient.
Balazs SpringerPlus 2013, 2:166 Page 6 of 14
http://www.springerplus.com/content/2/1/166To begin, it should be noted that neither ‘being
pleased,’ nor ‘being pleased that someone is suffering’
are, strictly speaking, properties. Both are expressions of
facts, thus, the problem of how to account for a difference
between facts is, in the quotation above, simply transposed
to the realm of universals. This is why the difference be-
tween the two putative properties remains puzzling. Let
us, therefore, reformulate the two ‘properties’ as ‘being
Pleased at’ and ‘being Pleased at Suffering (of) (at/from)’
(read, for instance,’ Jim is pleased at Joe’s suffering from
headache.’) Evidently, these are relational entities, or sim-
ply, relations. The first is a simple universal, the second,
involving a reference to another relation (‘Suffers at/
from’), appears to be a complex universal. For sake of
grammatical simplicity, let us replace ‘being Pleased at’
with ‘Enjoys12.’
Following the line of argument about the instantiation
of the relation value ‘Loves’ it may first be assumed that
the content of the relation value ’Enjoys’ is the same in
Schadenfreude as in other, morally acceptable, cases of
enjoyment. Then it can be maintained that the enjoy-
ment of suffering is a true case of enjoyment, and per-
haps add that ethical theory must depart here from
axiology13. But it seems possible to argue that enjoying
suffering or pain is always a perverted or an impure kind
of enjoyment, or perhaps a combination of sentiments
and feelings that is fundamentally, ontologically different
from enjoyment, a case of joy, even though there is no
separate word for that14. Briefly, if we want to maintain
the enjoying suffering is not a true case of enjoyment,
thus, the value of ‘Enjoys’ is not instantiated, we may in-
sist that another relation value (if it is a value at all) is
instantiated.
Secondly, the instantiation of enjoyment as a value is
not merely a matter of the content or the relation but
also of the relata and the context. Thus, even if the rela-
tion ‘Enjoys’ is instantiated and it relates adequate
relata15, there is the possibility, outlined above, that cer-
tain axiological properties instantiated by the relata in-
fluence the instantiation of the value of ‘Enjoys.’ Unlike
the complexities of ‘Loves,’ the worth of the relatum that
is being enjoyed is usually easier to determine. Pain and
suffering are in most cases disvalues, even though they
might have some value aspect as well (I might enjoy the
[sight of? experience of? a] painful tiredness of my son,
after a long bicycle tour). But enjoying disvalues is
hardly a value. Thus, in the case of ‘Enjoys the Suffering
(of ) (at/from),’ the value relation of ‘Enjoys’ is not in-
stantiated, after all.
It is here where the fact that in ‘Enjoys the Suffering
(of ) (at/from)’ we have to deal with two relations be-
comes relevant. For suppose that the suffering of a hu-
man being is well-deserved. Some scholastics opined
that the sight of those suffering in the Hell is a source ofenjoyment for those in the Heaven. The idea behind the
justification for such an enjoyment is that Hell is a result
of divine justice and suffering in it is deserved. If one
enjoys deserved suffering, one does not enjoy a disvalue,
but something worthy (usually, but not always, due to
moral reasons and disvalues)16. We may then interpret
the case in point such that ‘Enjoys the Suffering of a
Wicked person’ where ‘wicked’ may be replaced by ‘hav-
ing negative worth.’ Of course, to arrive at an ethically
right judgement of ‘Enjoys,’ one needs to look deeper in
the individual case. It may also be argued that in ‘de-
served suffering ‘desert’ and ‘suffering’ must be delicately
and minuciously balanced so that the pain or suffering
wipes off, as it were, the transgression. This may happen
automatically, for instance, when a child feels immediate
pain after wounding his finger despite warnings, but often
it needs external remedy. In such cases we usually have a
number of further requirements which are, of course, not
our concern here. It suffices to note here that unless pun-
ishment is proportionate to the misdeed, suffering be-
comes a disvalue and ‘Enjoys’ is not instantiated.
It is also arguable that what gets instantiated in such
cases is not ‘Enjoys’ but ‘is morally Satisfied at’ or some-
thing like this; or perhaps ‘Enjoys Justice’ which, obvi-
ously, would dispel all reservations about enjoying some
cases of suffering as being only apparent cases of ‘Enjoys
Suffering (of ) (at/from).’ The point remains, namely, that
a change in the relatum (carrying out a morally evil ac-
tion, or, repentance), which may partly be brought about
by further relations’ being instantiated (the wrongdoer
may suffer from a disease wholly unrelated to his mis-
deeds) affects the instantiation of the relation. Such a
change may block it.
Thirdly, since enjoyment and suffering (pleasure and
pain) are related to one another in an opposite way, it is
a reasonable assumption that they play negatively consti-
tutive, blocking roles in one another’s instantiation. But
it is impossible to tell in principle where enjoyment
ceases and something else (hatred, despise, cruelty) re-
places it; or where ‘pure’ suffering ceases and something
else (e.g. courage), replaces it. It is psychological suffer-
ing that is especially complicated. Think, for instance, of
jokes told at another person’s expense in his presence.
His suffering might be undeniable, yet the enjoyment of
his pain by others might not be entirely bad. Sometimes
suffering of this kind is fundamentally, ontologically, tied
up to certain values such as comradeship, equality,
which surely are values worthy of enjoyment.
It is hardly necessary to consider in detail further cases
of “mixed wholes” or “organic wholes” in which suffering
or pain and pleasure or enjoyment participate. The ana-
lysis of such cases runs on the same track as in the case of
malicious pleasure. Take some complicated cases, such as
the following: Jim suffers at Joe’s partly undeserved
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case: Ann suffers at Barbara’s suffering at Cindy’s deserved
pleasure. In simple words, Barbara is envious of Cindy
and Ann feels ‘compassion’ for her. Such cases can be
changed ad libitum: Cindy might suffer at Barbara’s being
envious of her and Ann may be compassionate with
Cindy. Remaining with the last case, we have to do with
three persons (particulars) and four relations. (i) ‘Cindy
(deservedly) Enjoys something, ‘ (ii) ‘Barbara Suffers at
Cindy’s enjoyment, ‘ (iii) ‘Cindy Suffers at Barbara’s envy, ‘
(iv) ‘Ann is Compassionate with Cindy(’s suffering).’ Sub-
scribers to the Moorean conception of intrinsic value
rooted in organic unities simply declare what normal
moral intuitions tell us, namely, that certain propositions
designate facts (‘wholes’) that have different values. If
pressed, they might say that as newer and newer relations
are added, the ‘value’ of the ‘whole’ changes. Thus, (i) is
valuable, (ii) is not, (iii) is valuable (perhaps) and (iv) is
also valuable. But in virtue of what these changes occur,
remains obscure.
If values are universals, either properties or relations,
then we have a conception by which the differences be-
tween (i) through (iv) can be explained. It is possible that
a value is instantiated in one case but not in another.
The ontological grounds for this can be different. As in
the former example, it may be the content of the value,
it may be the relata (in case of relation values) or the
context that is responsible for the instantiation of the
value or for the blocking of it.
Envy and compassion
Enjoyment of what is good and valuable is undoubtedly a
value. Enjoying suffering can be interpreted in various
ways, and the moral intuition, that in some cases it is fun-
damentally evil despite the presence of ‘Enjoys’ or some-
thing similar to it, can be axiologically justified. Now
though the general lessons drawn from the analyses of
love and malicious pleasure entail the explanations of fur-
ther axiologically disturbing cases, such as suffering at an-
other person’s deserved enjoyment which is intuitively not
a disvalue, despite the presence of suffering; and that of
suffering at another person’s undeserved suffering which
is intuitively a value, despite the presence of suffering, it
will be useful to outline these explanations.
In the case of being pained by another person’s de-
served enjoyment we are inclined to say that it is not
only the pain or suffering in itself that is bad, it is made
worse by a value (namely, the value of enjoyment on the
part of the other person). If we find this analysis un-
acceptable or simply puzzling, we can turn to the usual
reasoning, and say that (1a) this is real suffering, though
to be morally condemned; (1b) this is not real suffering,
despite the emotional, psychological, etc. similarities, but
something ontologically different for which we have, inthis case, fortunately, a separate word, envy17; (2) this is
not real pain or suffering because a disvalue presupposes
the negative worth of the particular at which the pain or
suffering is directed, which does not obtain here18; (3) as
said above, enjoyment and suffering are counterparts,
being specially related to one another, and the deserved
enjoyment of the other person blocks the instantiation
of suffering as a real disvalue.
Compassion (shared suffering, Mitleid) is generally con-
sidered morally praiseworthy. In practice, much caution is
required, however. Hitler’s anguish about losing the war
does not justify compassion. But being compassionate
with someone undeservedly suffering is a value. Again, on
the face of it, compassion seems to be a value based on
disvalue, or on two instances of the disvalue ‘Suffers.’ (1a)
One may insist, therefore, that compassion is suffering,
axiologically a disvalue, yet ethically right. (1b) Alterna-
tively, compassion may be something different from suf-
fering, pain, not with standing certain similar features19.
(2) As enjoying a disvalue is no more a value but a dis-
value, suffering because of a disvalue is a value. In the first
case, enjoyment loses its value aspect, that is, it is no more
a relation value. In the second case, suffering, which is
overwhelmingly, but not entirely (see the example of tired-
ness), a disvalue, takes on a value aspect, and becomes a
relation value. If the suffering of the other person is de-
served, compassion may take on a disvalue aspect, and be-
come a relation disvalue (sentimentalism, perhaps). Notice
that in these cases we are talking not only about the in-
stantiation of a value or a disvalue, but also of the univer-
sal ‘being a value.’ (3) Finally, it could be argued that
compassion is strongly connected with love, even in the
case of strangers20, and it is love that ‘helps’ compassion
as a relation value obtain. Even if compassion were always
related to love, and no case of being compassionate with-
out love obtained, the two relations were still different,
since love does not ‘require’ a disvalue (suffering) to get
instantiated. Yet it is possible that love does‘require’ com-
passion to become more itself, and we have a chain of
values in which the instantiation of a disvalue (suffering)
plays a certain role which is, perhaps, not simply ‘illumin-
ation’ but a kind of constitution. The ethical consequences
are, again, up for further discussions.
Compassion may be generalized, as it is a particular
case of a value ostensibly ensuing from two disvalues.
On a more general level we get that hating evil (being
pained by pain, angered by cruelty, resenting injustice,
etc.) is good, even though hate and evil are both dis-
values. But such generalizations are not always done
with sufficient care. It is arguable that the hatred of evil
is different from the kind of hatred that is inherently
bad. Psychologically, these attitudes are not easy to sep-
arate, and may often overlap, which has been a source of
much fanaticism in history, but phenomenologically they
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nomenology and moral psychology to explain the dif-
ference. Axiology has its own resources for that. If
something exists that rightly deserves hatred, hatred as
a disvalue is instantiated, but takes on a value aspect
and becomes partly a relation value. The relatum plays
a constitutive role not only in the instantiation of a
disvalue, hatred, but also in the instantiation of a
higher-order property of being a value. And it may be
argued that hating evil as a value presupposes the love
(and knowledge) of good, an evident value, and thus its
instantiation is a matter of the obtaining of certain
other axiological facts21.
The instantiation of being a value
The analyses of compassion and hating evil revealed that
the instantiation of values is not only a matter of the rela-
tion, the relata, and the context, but also of the higher-
order property of being a value. The property of being a
value is a second-order property, instantiable by first-order
properties and relations. As was suggested, there are prop-
erties and relations that may instantiate the property of be-
ing a value to various degrees or intensity. Moreover,
certain properties and relations may instantiate both the
property of being a value and of being a disvalue. Thus, it
is possible to argue that whereas love is a pure value, enjoy-
ment is perhaps not entirely such; pain and suffering are
overwhelmingly disvalues, but may take on value aspects
as well22. More ambiguous value properties and relations
include ‘originality, ‘provocativeness’ as well as ‘competes
with’ or ‘is excited by23.’ The ambiguity results from the
ontological fact that the property of being a value/disvalue
does not fully saturate, so to speak, the respective proper-
ties or relations.
Exploiting this ontological fact we may find an axio-
logical answer to the disturbing question of what makes
otherwise detestable, horrible things, such as the crema-
toria of Ausschwitz, worthy of preservation; or what
makes the Cross worthy of replication and cherishing.
Could we say that we preserve the barracks and other
remains of Ausschwitz because they are valuable?
In a sense, nothing could be more worthy of destruc-
tion. But it is possible to try to make sense of objects of
this kind possessing some kind of a value. For instance,
we may argue that despite the disvalues such objects
possess (usually relation disvalues, such as ‘causing
pain’), innocent blood, so to speak, consecrated the in-
struments of torture for good and they have become
‘holy.’ To clarify the axiological-ontological background
of such a value would require a separate discussion. It is
merely a suggestion that there is such a value as secular
holiness that can arise from human suffering or from
any major human achievement, and is instantiated by
physical objects. Holiness is one of the purest values, andis probably the integrative value of all religious (religiously
relevant) values, working in quite the same way: a special
divine presence is it that consecrates a certain thing, place,
or time (but also persons, events). If we do feel that there
are instruments, places, buildings that ‘demand’ from us a
very special attitude, not reducible to other, perhaps simi-
lar, attitudes24, we may perhaps sense a presence of a spe-
cial value, that of secular holiness25.
But there is another, perhaps more commonsense, ar-
gument for not destroying the instruments of utter de-
struction. This is that those instruments (in the broad
sense) remind of people of horrible sins committed
against innocent people and mankind in general. And
this is important and good. But ‘Reminds’ is a relation
that can hardly be called a unequivocal or pure value. In
many cases we use things to remind us of other people
we want to continue hating. Or want to take revenge. In
fact, nothing precludes that certain people take inspir-
ation from the sight of Ausschwitz to carry out similar
crimes, or, to be more modest, that they get disillusioned
by the moral prospects of mankind and become cynics;
or that they simply begin to despise the victims for not
having resorted to violent resistance against the horrors,
and so on. The possible effects of ‘reminds of something
disvaluable/worthless’ are by no means unequivocally or
necessarily positive. Whether or not they are positive de-
pends usually on the character, and, axiologically, the
worth of those affected. If the relation in question partic-
ipates in the property of value at all, the value, and
through it, the property of being a value, is instantiated
only if the affected particular (the person reminded) dis-
plays the expected positive reactions. The person’s worth
plays here a decisive role not only in the instantiation of
a relation value, but also in instantiation of the property
of value, too26.
Particularity and value
In many cases we feel that the uniqueness or irreplaceabil-
ity of the particular that instantiates various values as well
as the supervening property of being a value confers a spe-
cial value to it. This is a challenge to the explanation given
here for the instantiation of values, since if some value su-
pervenes on a particular’s being unique then not all values
are universals. This would shake the grounds of the present
conception which presupposes that all values are universals
(and that there are higher order universals, including the
one of being a value). Let us face this challenge.
The proposition that “a has a unique/special value”
can be interpreted in various ways. It may mean that a
has at least one value which makes it prima facie worthy
of a positive attitude. Evidently, this interpretation is not
related to the problem of particularity. It is merely a se-
mantic tool to emphasize the importance of the respect-
ive value that is instantiated.
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more meaningful ways. For instance, it may mean that a
possesses a special combination of values, not possessed
by any other particular. But this may be only an
existential-practical proposition. As long as the actual or
potential existence of another particular, displaying the
same combination of values, cannot be excluded, the
particular combination of the affected values is repeat-
able and uniqueness is, ontologically, gone. Suppose,
however, that any such possibilities can be excluded. For
instance, it is hard to imagine another Mona Lisa,
painted by Leonardo as a replica of the one we know, to
exist somewhere. Does the one in the Louvre, then, pos-
sess a special value, in addition to the aesthetic, intellec-
tual, etc. ones it has? There are, it seems, two possible
interpretations of such a particular’s having something
unique about it.
First, the special combination or ‘bundle’ of individual
values, their interrelations, and the various intensities of
their being values are still, in principle, repeatable uni-
versals. It is possible to make a copy of the Mona Lisa
that is identical with the one painted by Leonardo, ex-
cept that the new one is not painted by him. The aes-
thetic enjoyment one draws from contemplating the
painting is not affected by the fact that it is the original
or a replica. But even if we consider it (or any other
complicated particular) practically impossible to copy,
uniqueness still attaches to the values, to universals in-
stantiated by the particular painting rather than to the
painting as a particular. Perhaps we may speculate fur-
ther and suggest that there is a higher-order universal
(a relation) which may be called ‘being combined
uniquely’ but it would be hard to see how the higher-
order universal of being a value can be linked to other
higher-order universals such as ‘being combined uni-
quely.’ Further, this suggestion does not dispel the
doubts that the very same universals may be ‘combined
uniquely’ repeatedly, and the value attached to particu-
larity gets lost, after all. Thus, the supposed higher-order
universal of ‘being combined uniquely’ appears to be ra-
ther vacuous27.
There is, however, a second interpretation of uniqueness
which makes an explicit reference to particulars. As it was
hinted at above, we usually attribute a special significance
to originality, to the fact that a particular artifact has a
unique relation to its maker (another particular). The
Mona Lisa is unrepeatable because its painter died long
ago28. Whereas the relation ‘being painted by’ is a univer-
sal, the relation ‘being painted by Leonardo da Vinci’ is
not, as it essentially refers to a particular. Particulars are
unique by definition, and if they enter a relation in an es-
sential sense, they ‘win over’ universals29, and we no more
have to do with the relation as a universal but with an in-
stance of it. But if a relation is not a universal, it cannot bea value, since values are universals. Can we, then, still in-
sist that some value is responsible for the special, unique
valuableness of the painting?
The answer is yes. For what may account for the special
or unique value of the Mona Lisa is not necessarily
Leonardo’s putative personal-particular value, but his ability
to create outstandingly valuable artifacts. This is an ability
that may be human-specific, but general, a true universal,
which can be called ‘being able to create valuable things.’
But it must be added that we also have an ability to create
disvalues, and to destroy values. Human beings routinely
create values and disvalues, or rather, value/disvalue in-
stances as they make or cause value/disvalue properties
and relations to be instantiated30. The ability to do so is, in
contrast to natural causation, itself a value/disvalue. It is
partly responsible for the dis/valuableness as well as the
worth of a particular. It is a relational property, and strictly
speaking, it must be considered a relation, and rendered as
‘creates (dis)value’ (a creates [dis]value X, where a is a par-
ticular and X is a universal). Thus, it is one of the values
possessed by the Mona Lisa that it was painted by someone
who had the ability to create such valuable particulars.
But is particularity not completely lost? After all, we attri-
bute great significance to the fact that the Mona Lisa was
painted by Leonardo and not by any able individual. That is
indeed true but there are two further things to be taken
into account. First, perhaps paradoxically, the special, ori-
ginal value of the Mona Lisa is a matter of Leonardo’s hav-
ing created other outstanding artifacts as well. His ability,
or rather performance, of having created things that are
unique in the sense analysed above (first interpretation) is
affected by those things themselves, making his worth
greater than the worth of an inferior artist (but presumably
not greater than all other artists!). We may say with no
more right that particularity is lost than that it has just been
created.
And secondly, uniqueness in this sense should not be
absolutized. Even if the Mona Lisa is unrepeatable, just
because it was painted by a great artist who died long
ago, it does not represent a value that cannot be com-
pared to anything else31. It is valuable partly because it
was painted by Leonardo, but that is only part of its
worth. We make comparions between ‘unique’ things
routinely and express the result, among other ways, in
our willingness to buy them at a given price, or to sacri-
fice other valuable things in their favor. There are many
outstanding painters, for instance, whose works are in
one sense incomparable (uniqueness), but in another
sense quite comparable (and expressible in terms of
prices).
Thus, the objection to the view that values are universals
taken from the fact that we often cherish and value things
because of their particularity, uniqueness, unrepeatability,
hence not all values are universals, can be countered most
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ability of creating value-instances. From this the worth of
particular individuals (in this example, of a painter) can be
deduced which then contributes to the instantiation of the
supposed special or unique worth of certain particulars.
This explanation is consistent with the conception of value
instantiation outlined here.
Rarity
As a final objection, let us consider the supposed value
of rarity. For it is obvious that there are objects consid-
ered to be valuable by many people exclusively on ac-
count of their rarity but not of any value they bear, nor
of the worth of the particulars they belong to. Evidently,
a rare stamp or a precious pearl cannot be connected
axiologically to the value-creating ability of their makers.
Whereas it might be impossible to duplicate a rare
stamp because the particular state of affairs in which it
was produced has already ceased to exist32, no such
problem arises for a pearl, except the time that is needed
for it to be formed. Of course, many rare objects do bear
certain values, but quite often these are merely of add-
itional nature (the stamp may not be beautiful at all,
though aesthetic qualities may increase its price).
But it is also pretty obvious that simple rarity is insuf-
ficient to explain the value of such things. At the ex-
treme, any particular may be considered rare, or rather,
unique, from which no value arises (see the previous
section). And there are many unique objects in the uni-
verse that have no or only very little such value (e.g. any
pebble or snowflake), or are positively disvaluable (per-
haps the prototype of new lethal weapon, or a meteorite
threatening the Earth). Taken ‘rarity’ less extremely, and
allowing for groups of objects that are considered to be
‘rare,’ that is, not unique but ‘small in number’ (another
relation), we see that rarity such understood is still in it-
self not a value33. It is, however, equally obvious that the
unique or particular value of a rare stamp has to do
something with its being rare, its being a stamp, and its
being collected (sought for).
For a piece of paper to qualify as a stamp, it must satisfy
a number of requirements, among which certain proper-
ties and, perhaps more essentially, relations figure. For in-
stance, it must be ‘issued by a sovereign authority’ (which
is an internal relation). And it must ‘be (have been) cap-
able of being used in normal mailing.’ But these qualities
of stamps do not make them valuable. Since rarity in itself
is not a value, we should look for other candidates.
Stamps collectors usually have a very special attitude
towards stamps, which is similar to, but also different
from, the attitude collectors of other curious objects
have towards their respective objects. The roots of such
attitudes can be rather different, but usually and origin-
ally linked to some values. In the case of stamps,aesthetic values prefigure. In the case of relics, religious
values come to mind. In the case of autograms, value-
creating abilities of artists lie in the background34. These
values might become rather blurred, and, as was said
above, in particular cases they really are only of add-
itional nature. The age when relics of saints were pas-
sionately, often violently, collected, is over, though the
number of relics has not significantly increased in the
meantime. Autograms of pop stars that were in great de-
mand long ago are valueless today.
These values vanishing, other value-grounds are ne-
cessary to explain the basic relation collectors have to
their cherished objects, whatever they actually are. Since
the relation ‘collects’ does not have any value-aspect in
itself, and there is no other verb to make the required
distinction, let us simply use an asterisk to denote the
relation value ‘Collects*35.’ This is similar to value-
creation, as it expresses a special human ability, no less
deeply rooted in human nature than value-creation, but
having a less intense or robust value-aspect36. Most
probably, there is a special joy or enjoyment arising out
of it. Even those who do not collect stamps may appreci-
ate the enjoyment of stamp collectors. Thus, although
the objects (particulars) human beings like to collect*
may have some connections to values, this in itself is not
sufficient to instantiate a new value on which the total
worth of a rare, collected* object supervenes. But we
have the testimony of times that human beings simply
like to collect* various things and this is the universal re-
lation having a certain value-aspect the instantiation of
which explains the axiological fact that certain objects
seem to be valuable in virtue of their rarity. Since it is
also a well-known fact that whether stamps or certain
photos or telephone cards are being collected* depends
not only their sheer rarity, but also on whether or not
they are in fashion, therefore ‘being in fashion’ (which is
another relation, or combination of relations) decisively
influences the context in which the relation of collects*
obtains and hence contributes to the instantiation of the
value relation of ‘Collects*37.’
It seems, then, that to explain the value customarily at-
tributed to rarity we can draw on another universal, the
relation value of Collects* even though in most cases of
collected* objects certain other value universals also play a
role. In contrast to the relation of ‘Creates value-
instances’ the relation of ‘Collects*’ instantiates the
property of being a value to a lesser extent, and in its in-
stantiation the worth of the relata is of lesser importance,
compared to the importance of the context (how many
people, how ardently seeking the rare objects).
Conclusion
Axiologists have had hard time in explaining Moorean
wholes which can have different value indexes than their
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ontological framework in which instantiation of univer-
sals is crucial to explaining how the world exists. It was
claimed that in a realist conception values are universals,
both properties and relations. Instantiation is an oper-
ation: how are universals linked to particulars? But the
usual understanding of this problem is static. It is pre-
occupied with the ‘link,’ its nature, its function, its be-
longing to this or that category of entities. It was
suggested here that instantiation is also a dynamic prob-
lem. The question of „how are universals linked to par-
ticulars?” is to be understood also as „in virtue of what is
a universal instantiated?” A number of value relations
were then discussed and it was argued that a pluralistic
conception is the best answer. The content of the relation,
the relata, and the context (the instantiation of further re-
lations) may all be responsible for the instantiation of the
relation value. The other important result was that there
is a further property, the one of being a value which is a
higher-order property which can be instantiated by rela-
tion (and property) values to various degrees. This also
plays a decisive role in the instantiation of individual
values.
The main lesson of this approach for axiology is that if
values are universals, which also implies value pluralism,
then the problem of organic or complex wholes having a
value which is not identical to the sum total of the
values of its parts can be explained, rather than merely
asserted. From this it also follows that if these conclu-
sions are sound, and the explanatory gain real, then the
axiological approach which starts out from a moderate
realist ontology is also vindicated.
Finally, a few hints at the possible consequences of this
approach to the theory of intrinsic value may be in order.
It was argued earlier that the problem of ‘value bearing’ it-
self suggests a realist approach. However, the various pro-
posals about ‘what’ bears value indicate that to most
axiologists ‘value bearing’ is tantamount to ‘intrinsic value
bearing.’ The notion of ‘intrinsicality’ is by no means crys-
tal clear, F. Feldman distinguishes between eight different
meanings38. What is clear, however, is that this notion is
meant to connect axiology to ethics, in the Moorean trad-
ition. The present account remains a step backwards as
has been emphasized several times. It is not the ethical in-
tuitions that need to be founded in axiology. Rather, it is
the axiological intuitions or, to be more accurate, the axio-
logical experiences, our encounters with values that have
to be accounted for first. There are many different en-
counters that present us with the world of many distinct
values. Since they are all values, we do need to account for
this fact as well, hence the conclusion that there is such a
property as being a value. In this context intrinsicality may
have two meanings. First, in a trivial sense, all values qua
universals are intrinsic (and disvalues are qua universalsalso intrinsic). Of course, all relations and properties are
intrinsic in this, rather vacuous, sense where intrinsicality
looks very much like identity. Secondly, values qua values
(that is, participating in the higher order universal of being
value) are also intrinsic. Intrinsicality is here understood
as a logico-existential requirement of any value to be a
value: any value must participate in the property of being
value in order to qualify as a value.
Endnotes
1 Sometimes we find a distinction made between intrin-
sic goodness and intrinsic badness, e.g. in Zimmerman
(2001) usually attached to states (of affairs) or facts, but
value and goodness are probably distinct categories and
the concept of intrinsic badness might not be identical
with intrinsic disvalue.
2 For suggestive attempts to explain instantiation see
Mertz (1996) and Baxter (2001). Both authors use the
term ‘aspect’ but their explanations are different.
3 ‘Being a spoon’ is a property that hardly can be in-
stantiated only partially or ‘to some extent.’ But ‘being
money’ is a property that is instantiable to different de-
grees. Economists may disagree on what financial instru-
ments are to be counted as ‘money.’
4 For a view that values are born by physical things and
persons see Rabinowicz-Rønnow-Rasmussen (2001); con-
crete things: Tännsjö (2005); concrete states of individuals:
Chisholm (2005); experiences: Audi (2003); states of af-
fairs: Lemos (1994); facts: Zimmermann (2001).
5 Moore (1988). His treatment of the topic is respon-
sible for this. His concern was to redirect ethical theory
and he uses the term ‘intrinsic value’ to get to the notion
of the ‘good’ as soon as possible. Thus, the very first oc-
casion to employ the term ‘intrinsic value’ or – as he
writes – ‘intrinsic worth’ is embedded in a longer discus-
sion of the ‘good’ as ‘the unique property of things’
(9., 17). There is no room for a consideration of individ-
ual values in this context.
6 ‘Love’ is the content of the relation ‘loves.’ For gram-
matical simplicity, the content will be identified with the
relation itself, unless the context requires stressing the
distinction.
7 I assume that love between persons (and possibly
collective subjects) is substantially different from love
that connects a person and an object or concept. („[T]he
proper, natural object of love is a person.” Mulligan
(1998), 173.
8 Note that the virtual presence of values is an epis-
temological, and not an ontological, statement. Values
and disvalues influencing the worth or valuableness of
the particulars must be actually instantiated, otherwise
the differences between the two cases could not be
accounted for. This is why M. Zimmerman’s proposal, to
explain the difference between right and wrong pleasure
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of virtual and actual value is unconvincing. His distinc-
tion is ontologically ungrounded, as it remains unex-
plained what makes actual value turn virtual and vice
versa. See Zimmerman (1999).
9 Another example could be the mutual supervenience
of being a human being and being conscious of being a
human being.
10 It seems possible to argue that, contrary to Aristotle’s
suggestion, recklessness is not an extreme form of cour-
age, but, at least in certain cases, it is a curious amalgam
of courage and cowardice. For recklessness is a more or
less conscious disregard for the consequences of one’s ac-
tion, and this disregard may arise from a fear of having to
face those consequences.
11 Lemos (1994), 46. Though not citing him, Irwin
Goldstein makes the same point: „ being maliciously
pleased has two components. The parts need not inherit
the whole’s properties. Malicious pleasure’s moral offen-
siveness is a property of the whole – the cognitive-
pleasure compound. We are not entitled to infer from
the whole’s being bad and offensive that the pleasure
component is also bad and offensive.” Goldstein, (2003),
28. This may be the case, indeed, but we still may wish
to know why the whole is ‘bad;’ whether it is worse just
because it contains a valuable component and if yes
why, and so on.
12 The reason is that ‘Enjoys’ is evidently a relation,
whereas ‘being Pleased at’ is less evidently a relation. In-
deed, it is difficult to imagine cases where one is pleased in
general, and not at something concrete, or is not pleased
by something concrete, and feels pleasure like feeling dis-
tressed or sleepy, but such cases may, on an exceptional
basis, be possible. Pain is similar. We are pained by some-
thing, or feel pain at something, but are rarely in pain not
related to a cause. However, such cases might be possible.
Difficult cases, favored by existentialism, include being in
fear, being worried, etc., without any apparent reason.
13 This is the position Lemos endorses (1994, 40–46).
14 Olson (2004) also refers to the „intentional relation”
of the relatum – the individual – as being constitutive of
value. Further, he argues that the phenomenological
identity of two experiences (both being pleasures) do
not compel one to the contention that they are
evaluatively also identical (that is, values). This latter
possibility is, in my view, not fully explored. It is possible
that the right moral evaluation of an experience of mali-
cious pleasure makes that experience phenomenologic-
ally (and perhaps also psychologically) different from an
experience of morally right pleasure.
15 A computer cannot enjoy anything. A person can-
not enjoy her own consciouslessness or a future state of
her that she is unaware of (such as, for instance,
enjoying a birthday gift).16 On valuing retributive punishment, see also Harman
(2000), Chapter 8.
17 Since envy is a disvalue which can be analysed psy-
chologically in terms of pain and pleasure (feeling pain
at someone’s deserved pleasure) but it is not a combin-
ation of a value and a disvalue, we might conclude that,
inversely, pleasure at another person’s pain must be an
ontologically independent disvalue, even though there is
no distinct word for it.
18 Olson (2004) talks about the „intentional relation”
of the person feeling pain/pleasure at another person’s
pain which is similar to my reference to the constitutive
role of the relata in the instantiation of values.
19 Like suffering under envy, suffering under compas-
sion is not direct physical pain.
20 No wonder that for many ethical theorists of the
British moral philosophical tradition compassion, em-
pathy or sympathy were even more fundamental phe-
nomena than love.
21 Thomas Hurka claims, following Moore, that „ [i]f x
is intrinsically evil, hating x for itself, though intrinsically
good, is not as intrinsically good as x is intrinsically evil.
Hurka (1992). The principle is perhaps just another way of
expressing the axiological truth that relation values inher-
ently connected with disvalues are always dependent on
the obtaining of other, non-disvalue-related, relation
values. But if the principle aims at a more precise guiding
of how to calculate valuableness and disvaluableness (and
worth), a more rigorously elaborated calculus is needed to
assess the validity of the principle.
22 Matthew Pianalto challenges the view that pleasure
is an intrinsic value. His argument is based on the dis-
tinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and is
meant to show that pleasure is inherently instrumental
to well-being, ‘the’ intrinsic good. But the argument may
be adapted to the present conception as contending that
pleasure is not identical with the higher-order property
of being a value (in fact, no first-order property or rela-
tion can be identical with it), and pleasure may instanti-
ate the property of being a disvalue, too. In any case,
that pleasure is the highest or sole (intrinsic) value is a
dubious claim. Pianalto (2009).
23 Another peculiar example is „ being a parent” (and/
or „being a father/mother”). The interesting question is
not whether parental (paternal, maternal) love is a value
since love is a value, but whether being a father/mother,
for instance, is a value not reducible to other values, in-
cluding love, even if in practice parental love is, perhaps,
inseparable from the consciousness, pride, and power of
parenthood.
24 Catholic and Orthodox theology has subtle distinc-
tions between reverence, adoration, worship etc.
25 Lady Diana’s dress is another object whose axio-
logical status has been extensively discussed in the
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secular sense, sounds rather sacrilegious, but not ne-
cessarily to all modern ears. See Rabinowicz, Rønnow-
Rasmussen (1999).
26 Axiology is, to repeat, not moral theory. Axiological
results must influence moral reasoning but do not re-
place it. How to determine the worth of a person is a
matter of moral theory.
27 A similar reasoning is possible for disvalues. It is
sometimes suggested the there are cases of rank evil
(persons like Stalin, events like the Holocaust) that
are somehow „ more unique” than similar cases and
this special status is partly explained in terms of a
unique combination (though in principle repeatable) of
disvalues.
28 Ch. Grau uses the same example, making the same
point about the particular history that an original piece
has to its author. (Grau, 2006). His own solution to the
puzzle of irreplaceability being a value for its own sake,
but not an intrinsic value (insofar as intrinsic value su-
pervenes on the object’s intrinsic properties which are
naturally repeatable) is to subsume it under the category
of „final values” in the Korsgaardian sense, though in a
distinct way. That is, his thesis is that uniqueness or par-
ticularity is a kind of value. What remains unclear is
why and how not everything that exists (the universe be-
ing made up of particulars) appears to have the same
value in virtue of its particularity.
29 Armstrong (1978).
30 Value creation is not to be understood as creating
universals but as making them obtain.
31 The comparability of values is a topic beyond the
scope of this paper. The suggestion here is that even if
particularity in itself were a value, it would still be only
one distinct value, contributing to the valuableness or
worth of the particular in question only partially, and
not at all precluding evaluative comparisons with other
particulars.
32 Of course, the latter case is more doubtful, since
technology allows for more and more chances to restore
a former technological state of affairs.
33 John O’Neill, who considers the problem of rarity
with view of environmental ethics, writes that „[r]arity
appears to confer a special value to an object. This value
is related to that of another irreducibly relational prop-
erty of environmental significance, i.e., diversity” (124).
This claim is related to another one, that the existence
of values does not presuppose the existence of human
beings (evaluators). The latter claim is consistent
with the present approach but the former is not. Rarity
seems to be constitutive of a relation value specific to
human beings (see below) but not, in itself, a value. En-
vironmental ethics is supportable on the grounds that
some, but not all, values are objective in the sense thatno conscious evaluators are necessary for them to exist.
Further, diversity (variety) as a value is ambiguous. “It”
might take up a value and a disvalue aspect as well, de-
pending on the context. A single rubin stone on a dress
might be more refined and elegant than a variety of pre-
cious stones. Variety might be related to opulence, con-
fusion, scare, even disgust. See O’Neill (1992).
34 There are even more dubious cases, such as four-
leaf clovers which are, indeed, rare, and thought to be
valuable by some people, but considered absolutely
worthless by most people.
35 Collecting* is different from simply collecting inso-
far as the former relation has an aspect of enjoyment,
pride, mastering, and especially treasuring, etc. that have
clear value-connections. This is perhaps what Christine
Korsgaard had in mind when considering „ [m]ink coats
and handsome china and gorgeously enamelled frying
pans” and saying that they “are all things that human be-
ings might choose partly for their own sakes under the
condition of their instrumentality: that is, given the role
such things play in our lives” (Korsgaard 2005, 89, em-
phasis added). Of course, her Kantian conception of
value relates every value to humanity, which is question-
able, but relation values, as was said earlier, might in-
deed turn out to be essentially linked up with the
existence human beings (though enthusiasts about ani-
mals may disagree, saying that parental love, for in-
stance, is a relation value instantiable in many species).
Zimmerman makes a similar point: “ethical goodness
is relative (. . .) to persons” (The Nature of Intrinsic
Value, 27).
36 That this might not be a value relation is a view that
J. Swift appears to endorse. In Gulliver’s Fourth Travel,
Ch. 7., we find a description of the detestable yahoos’
passion for collecting and hiding worthless stones.
37 The reasons of why certain things are in fashion are
famously difficult to explain. Historically, one of the
most amusing example is the tulipomania in the 16th
century Holland.
38 Feldman (1998).
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